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The Idea of Social Life
LLOYD E. SANDELANDS
University of Michigan
This paper reclaims the idea that human society is a form of life, an idea once
vibrant in the work of Toennies, Durkheim, Simmel, Le Bon, Kroeber, Freud,
Bion, and Follett but moribund today. Despite current disparagements, this idea
remains the only and best answer to our primary experience of society as vital
feeling. The main obstacle to conceiving society as a life is linguistic; the logical
form of life is incommensurate with the logical form of language. However, it is
possible to extend our conceptual reach by appealing to alternative symbolisms
more congenial to living form such as, and especially, art.
The basic facts of human social life-that it is social and that it is
alive-are easily overlooked. Yet an alien intelligence seeing human
society for the first time could not but be impressed with its sheer
presence-people are ever together, in the home, at work, in the cafe,
theater, shopping mall, library, on the road, rails, or in the air, tied by
telephone and parcel post, joined en masse by broadcast media, and
connected through time and space through photograph, phonograph,
novel, history, art, poem, reminiscence and imagination. Likewise, an
alien intelligence could not but be impressed by the vitality of these
societies. They are intricate coordinations of actions, materials, and
ideas that are bom, develop, mature, evolve, move, act, think, feel,
disband, and die, only to be bom again. Some live long, others flash
for an instant. Most give an impression of life.
This paper examines the idea of social life-an idea that enjoys little
prestige in social science today, but which remains one of its philo-
sophical challenges. Although there is little room for it in a science
enamored of matter, energy, and information, the idea of life won’t go
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away, and for good reasons. The paper is a set of work notes toward
a conception of social life; a coming to terms. It finds in the old idea
of society as organism a primary sense and understanding of human
social life. The paper aims to bring this idea more squarely into focus
in hopes of rooting social science more firmly in human experience.
IMAGES OF LIFE
It seems social science can hardly escape the fact of life. Many of its
older texts on society (on groups, organizations, kinship systems,
markets, institutions, etc), and a few of its newer ones, teem with
organism. The same can be said of popular writings, which are no less
telltale for being popular. No mere literary flourish, images of organ-
ism express an exuberant intuition of life that is the basis and reason
for our interest in society. Such images capture the imagination, take
us in.
Growing up in the shadow of natural science, under the redoubt-
able influence of Darwin, social science began by seeing social order
as an extension or analogue of biological order. Durkheim (1893/1933)
conceives the division of labor in terms adapted from Darwin’s theory
of speciation-particularly the idea of differentiation due to density-
dependent competition.1 Others since have nursed the idea of human
social life. Selznick (1956), for example, defines the social institution
as &dquo;a natural product of social needs and pressures-a responsive,
adaptive organism&dquo; (5). Institutional theory, for Selznick, is about
natural social processes within formal bureaucracy. &dquo;Taking account
of both internal and external social forces,&dquo; he writes, &dquo;institutional
studies emphasize the adaptive change and evolution of organization
forms and practices&dquo; (12). The same concern for organism in relation
to formal organization appears in Thompson (1967).
Images of organism appear also in the works of Le Bon and Freud.
In crowds of certain kinds, Le Bon (1903) sees not only an organism
but an organism having mental unity, a mind. And in the massive and
elaborate social forms of the Prussian army and Catholic church,
Freud (1922/1959) sees vestiges of humankind’s archaic primate heri-
tage as a horde animal, an image again borrowed from Darwin. By
the group, Freud intends a vital entity having its own ambivalent
psychology. Animal energies (which are primarily sexual in nature)
compel a person to unite with others, either physically, in what Freud
calls &dquo;object cathexis,&dquo; or psychologically, in &dquo;identification.&dquo; At the
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same time, an opposing impulse arises to reject those others who, by
uniting with the person, threaten his or her autonomy: The animal’s
drive for self-preservation pushes people apart and dashes with the
animal instinct for reproduction, which pulls them together.2 The
result of this push and pull is a dynamic psychology of groups.
Groups arise when forces of attraction (psychological identification)
and forces of repulsion (self-preservation) play out in two vital dy-
namics : (1) in the emergence of a leader or object which group mem-
bers incorporate into their own ego ideal, and (2) in the displacement
of interpersonal antipathies (primarily envy) outside the group upon
enemy outgroups, thus transforming those antipathies into mutual
identification. According to Freud, the group form based upon a
leader or object recapitulates an archaic primate heritage once epito-
mized by the (mythical?) &dquo;primal horde&dquo; and today seen in residuum
in the nuclear family.
Freud’s vital psychology of the group is further detailed in Bion’s
(1961) studies of small therapy groups. Bion defines the group as &dquo;an
interplay between individual needs, group mentality, and culture&dquo;
(55). &dquo;Individual needs&dquo; refers to the will of group members to satisfy
conscious and rational desires; &dquo;group mentality&dquo; refers to the will of
the group to act in ways that satisfy members’ unconscious wishes, a
will generally opposed to the avowed aims of individual members;
and &dquo;group culture&dquo; refers to activity orientations and syndromes of
feeling that result from conflicts between individual needs and group
mentality. Three basic types of group culture vie for expression:
flight/fight, pairing, and dependence. In the flight/fight culture, the
group acts as if in response to a threatening enemy In the pairing
culture, the group acts as if reproduction were its primary concern,
and group members form emotional bonds with one another. In the
dependence culture, the group acts as if its main aim were to subor-
dinate individual needs to the control of a dominant leader. What
makes the group a group, according to Bion, is the constant interplay
and elbowing for control of action and emotion elements.3
One of the earliest images of organism in sociology appears in
Toennies’s (1876/1957) study of the gemeinschaft. The gemeinschaft,
writes Toennies, is perfect unity of individual wills. It is an organ-
ism, a unity whose elements are joined in a mutually affirming
like-mindedness exclusive of individual identity and self-interest.
Toennies conceives this unity to be the natural and original condition
of human society, having its basis in kinship, originally of blood and
family, but later in ties of geography, race, and nationality. It is signifi-
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cant of Toennies’s analysis that he finds the gemeinschaft to be the
only true form of society. This is in contrast to the gesellschaft, which
he defines as a collection of individuals and which he diminishes as
mere abstraction. &dquo;Everything real,&dquo; he writes, &dquo;is organic in so far as
it can be conceived only as something related to the totality of reality
and defined in its nature and movements by this totality&dquo; (192). For
Toennies, if only organisms are real, then society is real only insofar
as it is an organism.
Distinct images of life appear also in Simmel (1971), who finds that
&dquo;all sociability is but a symbol of life&dquo; (162), particularly &dquo;as it shows
itself in the flow of lightly amusing play&dquo; (162). Interaction becomes
a social reality when it is sensibly alive (72). For Simmel, social form
is defined by two empirically inseparable elements: an interest or
motive content and a mode of interaction to express that content. A
good example of his concern for living dynamism appears in his
description of conflict. Conflict, according to Simmel, is &dquo;designed to
resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity,
even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties&dquo;
(70). It is a mode of interaction full of life and organism:
A more comprehensive classification of the science of the relations of
men should distinguish, it would appear, those relations which consti-
tute a unit, that is, social relations in the strict sense, from those which
counteract unity. It must be realized, however, that both relations can
usually be found in every historically real situation. The individual
does not attain the unity of his personality exclusively by an exhaustive
harmonization, according to logical, objective, religious, or ethical
norms, of the contents of his personality. On the contrary, contradiction
and conflict not only precede this unity but are operative in it at every
moment of its existence. Just so, there probably exists no social unit in
which convergent and divergent currents among its members are not
inseparably interwoven. An absolutely centripetal and harmonious
group, a pure unification (Vereinigung), is not only empirically unreal, it
could show no real life process. The society of saints which Dante sees
in the Rose of Paradise may be like such a group, but it is without any
change and development; whereas the holy assembly of church fathers
in Raphael’s Disputa shows if not actual conflict at least a considerable
differentiation of moods and directions of thought, when flow all the
vitality and the really organic structure of that group. (72)
Simmel adds to the image of living society in a footnote that
explores the vital tension between attractive and repulsive forces of
love and hate:
The highest conception indicated in respect to these contrasting pairs
appears to me different: we must conceive of all these polar differen-
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tiations as of one life; we must sense the pulse of the central vitality even
in that which, if seen from the standpoint of a particular ideal, ought
not to be at all and is merely something negative; we must allow the
total meaning of our existence to grow out of both parties.... We are
everywhere enmeshed in this dualism-in the most intimate as in the
most comprehensive provinces of life, personal, objective, and social.
We think we have, or are, a whole or unit which is composed of two
logically and objectively opposed parties, and we identify this totality
of ours with one of them, while we feel the other to be something alien
which does not properly belong and which denies our central and
comprehensive being. Life constantly moves between these two tenden-
cies. The one has just been described. The other lets the whole really be
the whole. It makes the unity, which after all comprises both contrasts,
alive in each of these contrasts and in their juncture. (emphases added,
72-3)
Finally, the image of life is also plain in Follett’s concept of social
organization as collective control (Follett 1937; Metcalf and Urwick
1942) and in Giddens’ concept of social life as structuration (Giddens
1979). For Follett (1937,161), organization is collective control; it is the
natural result of actors (both individuals and groups) acting upon
each other in dynamic interplay For Giddens, who is a refreshing
exception on the scene today, society comprises &dquo;forms of life&dquo;
wherein social agents employ resources and rules in the recursive
production and reproduction of social systems, a dynamic he calls
&dquo;structuration.&dquo; Here, too, society is a dynamism, a form of life, rather
than a hypostatized entity: The thrust of Giddens’ theoretical program
is to jettison the idea of much of conventional social theory, that
organization is a simple thing in the world, and to see it instead as an
unfolding dynamism, a form of life.
Two Examples
Images of the life of a society or group are difficult to appreciate in
the abstract, not only because life is a mystery but because it is
tempting to account for a society or group in terms of the individuals
who make it up. The lives of individuals are almost irresistible figures
in perception, and they leave little room in mind for the life of the
group. Even so, it sometimes happens that the dynamics of the group
are more compelling than those of individuals.
Life is a defining intention of jazz groups and improvisational
theater. Improvisation consists in ideational and actional spontaneity,
fluency, and responsiveness. It is an integral organism responsively
in touch with its circumstances. It is also a fragile condition disrupted
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by any loss of focus or by any failure of members to honor the group
as a whole. Its minimum requirement is that group members be open
enough to one another that ideas and actions can play off one another
in a vital unfolding. This does not guarantee organism, but it is a sine
qua non. The sure enemy of improvisation is &dquo;blocking,&dquo; which arises
when a member does not respond directly and honestly to the over-
tures of others. Whether it takes the form of defensiveness and/or
withdrawal or, conversely, self-assertive stage-hogging, it is a kind of
death in the life of the group. This relationship of blocking to the living
dynamism of the group can be seen in this excerpt from Wierba and
Allison’s (1994) unpublished study of improvisational theater groups:
All of our respondents mentioned that blocking hurts improvisation.
One respondent recounted a blocking example and said this about the
results: &dquo;You could just feel the energy sucked out of the scene and it
completely died. The scene was completely dead.&dquo; Another respondent
described what happens on stage when an actor blocks as returning the
improvisation to the everyday. &dquo;It becomes like, unfortunately, your
average conversation in real life which is that I say what I want to say,
then you say what you want to say, and we don’t listen to each other,
you know. Like talking to your television set.&dquo; (12)
A more poignant illustration of living form in a group appears in
Norman MacLean’s (1992) searching chronicle of the consummation
by fire of all but three members of an elite crew of United States Forest
Service Smokejumpers in Mann Gulch, Montana. Although there are
many layers in MacLean’s telling of the story, the gist of the event is
as follows: On August 5, 1949, a 16-man crew of fire fighters para-
chuted safely to fight what appeared to be a medium-sized (60-90
acre) forest fire. Barely an hour after their arrival, all but three mem-
bers of the crew were dead. Two members survived by outrunning
the fire to the safety of a ridge; another member, the leader, survived
by lighting an escape fire in the ashes of which he huddled as the main
fire passed overhead. For the fated, unable to outrun a towering wall
of flame which moved at nearly twice their speed, their last best
chance of survival was lost when they failed to obey the leader’s order
to join him in the ashes of the escape fire.
What makes this story a compelling demonstration of the life of the
group is the integrity of the group at all events and in spite of
sweeping changes in its organization and logic of action. Even after
its chain of authority broke down, leaving the crew without a leader,
the group remained intact in its fatal flight. The men who died did so
together, as a group. Their remains were discovered in a straight line
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along the path of the wildfire; and this despite the fact that their only
hope of evading the fire was to take a different path up the side of the
gulch to its ridge (where the fuel was thinner, the grade of the hill
flatter, and the danger of the fire less). This alternate route might have
occurred to more of these men had they acted as individuals. The two
men who survived also did so together, as a group, by taking this
alternate route. Thus, fortunate or no, crew members acted as a group.
The only exception, and his position bears noting, was the leader-the
one member of a group, according to Freud, likely to think and act on
his or her own behalf.
Weighing against this interpretation of group life is the crew’s
failure to heed the orders of their leader, a lapse that has led many to
conclude that every man was acting for himself. But a closer exami-
nation of this turn of events finds an even stronger affirmation of
group life. The deaths of the crew did not come simply in their acting
as a group, but in their acting as the wrong kind of group. In Bion’s
terms, its group mentality was mistaken. When the need was for a
dependence culture (in which the group submits to a leader), the
group was in a flight/fight culture to evade a threatening enemy.
Tragically, the group’s prospects for successful flight were diminished
by the interval of confusion in not obeying the order that would have
saved them, and, perhaps (although this is moot), by the added
velocity contributed by the escape fire that would have saved them.
For those who died, one imagines that there was no time in the searing
final moments of fear to appreciate this dynamic of group life. For the
leader who survived, there was the rest of a life to mull over his failure
to lead and the group’s failure to be led.
Finally, the case for the life and integrity of the Smokejumper crew
also gains by contrast to accounts based upon individual psychology.
One such account is proposed by Weick (1993), who explains the
Mann Gulch tragedy as a crisis of meaning. In contrast to Freud, who
argues that the group is made of emotional ties that are enhanced by
threats to the group, Weick maintains that the group is made of shared
ideas that are disproved by threats to the group. Weick thus conceives
the Mann Gulch fire as a &dquo;cosmological episode&dquo; in which group
bonds, and obedience to the leader, dissolved when shared meanings
(which he argues were tenuous to begin with) were inadequate to
meet the needs of individuals in the situation. In such a situation of
confused meaning, individuals panicked and ran, every man for
himself. Thus, for Weick, the tragedy of Mann Gulch was not that of
a group psychology gone awry, but that of a failure of group psychol-
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ogy to hold up under the cosmological demands of desperate circum-
stances. However, this interpretation faces two arguments in opposi-
tion. First, it is difficult to see this situation as a crisis of meaning. The
situation was comprehensible within the framework of what the fire
crew was trained to do. Acting as a group, they are either to fight the
fire or to flee from it to safety. The dilemma in this case, and what
makes it seem to be a dissolution of the group, is that, at the same time
the leader was telling the crew (somewhat paradoxically) to flee the
fire by lying down inside an escape fire, the rather more impressive
tower of flames rushing toward them was telling them to flee the fire by
running away from it. Caught between countervailing imperatives,
the group sensibly followed to its tragic end what must have seemed
the more compelling of the two. Second, this interpretation is at odds
with what is known about how individuals in groups respond to
crisis. In what may very well be an instinctive reaction, groups under
duress pull together and become more cohesive and unitary rather
than less. This is reinforced by the tendency of individuals in crisis to
regress to dominant modes of responding, often to the detriment of
higher-level thought. Indeed, if there is ever a time when cosmology
is beside the point, it is in crisis.
DOUBTS AND CONCERNS
Life is wonderful to live, but murder to say A wide gulf separates
social life as it appears to awareness and social life as we conceive and
talk about it. Images are not concepts. The few concepts of life in social
science attest to the difficulties of formulating them.
&dquo;The status of life in Nature,&dquo; writes Whitehead (1934, 53), &dquo;is the
standing problem of philosophy and of science.&dquo; Indeed, his difficult
philosophy of organism is an affidavit to this. Even biology the
science of life-fumbles with the concept and, at times, gives an
impression of being ashamed of it. Typically, life is conceived ab-
stractly as a structure or process that manifests certain functions, such
as growth, development, and reproduction. However, when defini-
tion turns to empirical operations, life amounts to no more than an
elaborate mechanism, a complex nexus of inanimate processes. Ac-
cording to the great morphologist, D’Arcy Thompson (1961): &dquo;The
form ... of any portion of matter, whether it be living or dead, and
the changes of form which are apparent in its movements and in its
growth, may in all cases alike be described as due to the action of force.
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In short, the form of an object is a &dquo;diagram of forces&dquo; (11). For many
biologists, there is no place for a dedicated concept of life or, indeed,
for any vital principle. To the scientific mind interested in laying bare
the causal order of life, vital principles are mystifying and obscuran-
tist, because they deny that life can be interpreted in physical terms.
This is why doctrinal vitalism is disreputable in biology. Vital princi-
ples are regarded as figures of speech, necessary in the breach, but to
be dropped as soon as practicable. Writes Dawkins (1989): &dquo;Human
suffering has been caused because too many of us cannot grasp that
words are only tools for our use, and that the mere presence in the
dictionary of a word like ’living’ does not mean it necessarily has to
refer to something definite in the real world&dquo; (18). A biological science
must keep to what is there. As von Bertalanffy observes: &dquo;The history
of biology is the refutation of vitalism&dquo; (quoted in Barlow 1991,110).
Where biology has explicated mechanical principles for vital phe-
nomena, as it did for the entelechy proposed by Driesch, it has let go
its vitalism. In biology, at least, life is not the mystery it once was (see
Searle 1984).
Biology’s doubts about the concept of life have not been lost upon
social science, where a similar retreat from vital concepts has been
underway Once a fact, social life came to be a metaphor or figure of
speech. In anthropology, this transformation is personified by Kroeber,
who, in writings of 1917, describes culture as a superorganism and
intimates autonomous vital properties. A generation later, in what he
himself calls a recantation, he writes, &dquo;As of 1948, it seems to me both
unnecessary and productive of new difficulties, if, in order to account
for the phenomena of culture, one assumes any entity, substance, kind
of being, or set of separate, autonomous, and wholly self-sufficient
forces&dquo; (Kroeber 1952,112). In sociology, the ascendance of structural-
functionalism in the 1950s and 1960s altered the image of society from
organism to system. When Parsons and Shils (1951) and Katz and
Kahn (1966) compare the structure and function of groups to biologi-
cal organisms, they are using metaphor. Their &dquo;systems&dquo; are not
organisms, but clockworks.4 Today, metaphorization of organism is
carried to its logical end by theorists inclined to interpretativism and
to the notion that social forms are social constructions of meaning
(e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1967; Morgan 1986). Organism, in this
view, is only an idea for thinking about social life. It is one of many
possible metaphors, or lenses, through which social life can be
glimpsed. In a veritable love-in of perspectives, each metaphor is
valued for its unique revelations and insights 5
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While not objecting to the idea of life per se, other writers question
its application to human society. Langer (1962), for example, argues
that the conditions that permit us to speak intelligibly of certain insect
societies as organisms do not obtain in the case of human societies. By
comparison to the individual ant, termite, or bee whose role in the
society is genetically programmed and who could not survive as an
individual apart from the colony, nest, or hive, the human individual
has real flexibility and choice about whether, and how, to participate
in the society: The human animal, argues Langer, is distinguished in
the zoological kingdom by its unique and unprecedented capacity for
symbolic thinking. This capacity, which is reflected in the human
awareness of self, of past, present, and future, of alternative worlds,
and of personal mortality, means that the human animal inhabits a
different world than the instinctively organized here-and-now world
of other animals. This capacity brings with it the uniquely human
need for self-expression and self-realization, which Langer calls &dquo;in-
dividuation.&dquo; This is a new phylogenetic development that rises up
to oppose the older instinct for social formation. The result, according
to Langer, is that human society is possible only as a kind of compact
among more or less free-thinking individuals. Whereas animal socie-
ties express instinct, human societies depend in significant measure
upon convention and socialization. Whereas animal societies are
integral organisms, human societies are organizations of free-standing
individuals.
Still, the evasions of organism underscore its centrality. There are
few theories of biological or social form that do not invoke an organic
principle of some kind. Rarely is this principle as naked as the elan
vital proposed by Bergson. Usually it comes dressed as an idea, such
as goal, purpose, emergence, autogenesis, organic solidarity, adapta-
tion, or structuration. Such ideas suggest entities that are more than
Newtonian clockworks, that are alive in some way There are impor-
tant questions here. What is behind the use of vital terms? Are they a
linguistic short-cut, or do they signify a deeper insight? If there is
nothing to organism, what makes biological and social entities seem
substantial and integral? Why doesn’t the idea of organism evaporate
with knowledge of mechanical details? Further, if this idea is mere
metaphor, why cannot we describe the literal reality behind it?
Following Kant, Cassirer (1953) has suggested that it may be in the
nature of the human mind to construe the natural world in terms of
ideas of organism. The intellect, according to Cassirer, is guided by an
inner idea of a determinative whole, in terms of which elements are
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conceived as parts. This is Kant’s &dquo;regulative idea.&dquo; In natural science,
the physically given organism naturally satisfies this imaginative
need, in what Cassirer describes as the remarkable suitability of the
human mind for the apprehension of nature. In social science, the
need for a determinative whole appears to be met by projective use
of the concept of organism. The only hitch, and it is an important one,
is that social organisms are not given to perception in the same way
as natural organisms.
To follow the lead of some biologists and categorically deny social
science the use of vital concepts makes it impossible to discover and
talk about social life, should it exist. This confuses the fact that
something cannot be analyzed or described verbally with the fact that
it does not exist. What could be more unscientific in spirit than barring
experiences that do not fit established categories and concepts? Vital
principles are invoked for some reason, despite being unwelcome.
Perhaps this is more than credulous innocence. Perhaps it is an
awareness of a real something beyond words.
TOWARD A METAPHYSICS OF SOCIAL LIFE
We are still living in an age which I think our successors will some day
look back upon with curiosity and wonder as an age characterized
especially by physical realism-an age strangely blind in some, but by
no means all, respects to what will then appear as outstanding spiritual
reality, and concealing this behind scientific abstractions which it had
taken for representations of reality and proceeded to bow down before,
though they were only its own creations. (Haldane 1931,114)
From Materialism to Organism
According to Whitehead, to understand life it is necessary to go
beyond the discredited materialist metaphysics of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century science which conceives nature as spatially iso-
lated bits of matter in motion. This metaphysics, he argued, is mean-
ingless and discloses no ground for the coherence of life. Echoing this
view, Sperry (1985) argues that biologists were wrong to disclaim the
doctrine of vitalism in favor of a materialist and reductivist metaphys-
ics. The mistake, he suggests, was in seeking properties of the whole
organism in the properties of its parts. In looking for signs of life, &dquo;we
biologists had been searching in the wrong places. You don’t look for
vital forces among atoms and molecules; you look instead among
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living things&dquo; (76). Sperry goes on to point out that you see life directly
in animals as they breathe, eat, run, respond, and mate. &dquo;Among such
actions and interactions, one finds plenty of evidence for vital phe-
nomena, forces, laws, and properties that are not to be found any-
where among inanimate objects nor among the molecules of which
the living are constituted&dquo; (77). A key notion in Sperry’s conception
of biological science is the integrity and causal primacy of the living
whole in relation to its constituent chemical and mechanical process-
es. &dquo;Emergent entities at higher levels contain, envelop and control
the properties and expression of the elementary particles&dquo; (83). The
result is a metaphysics which gives precedence to life over matter.
In scientific theory, this means that the trajectories through space and
time of most of the atoms on our planet are not determined primarily
by atomic or subatomic laws and forces, as quantum mechanics would
have it, but rather are determined by the laws and forces of chemistry,
of biology, of geology, of meteorology, of psychology, even sociology,
politics, and the like. The molecules of all higher living things, for
example, are not moved around in our biosphere so much by molecular
laws and forces as they are by the living, vital powers of the particular
species in which they are embedded. Such molecules are flown through
the air, galloped across the plains, propelled through the water, etc., not
by molecular forces (nor by quantum mechanics) but by specific holistic
vital properties possessed by the organisms. (80)
Evolution produces ever greater and more encompassing causal
structures and processes. Those of life supersede those of matter.
Again from Sperry:
The creative process in evolution involves control variables, forces and
pressures operating at many different levels from the sub-molecular up
to the ecologic, meteorologic and even astronomic ... It may have
started initially at the molecular level but as the process evolves, it
incorporates space-time design, pattern and form factors at higher
levels that, once established, become just as real and causal as those at
the molecular level.... Human nature and these higher kinds of con-
trols in nature don’t reduce any more to physical and chemical mecha-
nisms, but have to be reckoned with now in their own form, in their
own right. Vital, mental, social and other higher forces, once evolved,
become just as real as the evolved forces of molecules and atoms and
must be given their due, over and above the elementary physical
components. (87)
A similar argument for adopting a metaphysics of life over and
against a materialist metaphysics of matter and energy was offered a
generation earlier by Haldane (1931). Like Sperry. Haldane finds it
impossible to describe life reductively in terms of physical and/or
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chemical structures and processes. Life, he argues, exists as a persis-
tent coordination, the essence of which is destroyed by any attempt
to parse its elements and relations. Elements of life cannot have a
separate existence because each bears an imprint of every other in the
coordination. Consequently, we must regard phenomena of life as an
&dquo;active manifestation of the persistent whole ... [this whole being]
what we call the life of the organism&dquo; (14). Apart from a holistic
conception of life are only endless details amongst which we grope
blindly and vainly for order or sense. Also like Sperry, Haldane
believes biology to be a higher plane of explanation than physics or
chemistry and that reducing biological interpretations to physical
interpretations degrades biology’s rightful position as a supervening
explanation. These are incommensurate modes of perception. To see
the world biologically is to no longer see it physically, in terms of
movements of matter and energy, but to see it in terms of life and its
maintenance.6 6
A resolute concept of life requires an alternative metaphysics
which identifies it as a real entity. Whitehead proposes such a meta-
physics in his philosophy of organism. The very idea of &dquo;a life,&dquo; he
argues, implies an individuality which appropriates myriad physi-
cal processes into a functioning unity Life is not a physical thing, but
a process. It is an ongoing act of immediate self-enjoyment or self-
realization, what he calls an occasion of &dquo;experience.&dquo; According to
Whitehead, a life is a succession of these acts or occasions, extending
from birth to the present in a single creative advance.
Whitehead’s concept of life can be described only in terms of
experiences that go beyond discrete physical elements and move-
ments. The act of self-enjoyment that comprises a life is unknowable
to a physical science restricted to a narrow range of objective sense
perceptions. Life is revealed in the guise of vague bodily activities and
wordless feelings that are more commensurate with its fluid dyna-
misms. Physical science misreads life because it fails to account for
that vast and fundamental realm of human experience that takes place
in the body: the realm of feeling.
No surprise then that an eloquent spokesperson for organism is the
poet cum botanist, Goethe. &dquo;The Godhead,&dquo; he writes, &dquo;is at work in
the living, not in the dead; it is present in everything in the process of
development and transformation, not in what has already taken
shape and rigidified&dquo; (in Engard 1952,12). &dquo;Form is something mo-
bile, something becoming, something passing&dquo; (13). &dquo;When we study
forms, the organic ones in particular, nowhere do we find perma-
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nence, repose, or termination. We find rather that everything is in
ceaseless flux&dquo; (23). In a science of morphology, therefore, &dquo;we must
avoid speaking in terms of what is fixed.&dquo; And this because, &dquo;what
has just been formed is instantly transformed, and if we would arrive,
to some degree, at a vital intuition of Nature, we must strive to keep
ourselves as flexible and pliable as the example she herself provides&dquo;
(24).
A more fine-grained concept of life, more useful for purposes of
scientific analysis, is proposed by Langer (1967). Langer finds that the
integral vitality distinguishing living from nonliving is a charac-
teristic of elements. In echo of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism,
Langer finds that the elements of life are not physical entities. They
have not the character of things, but of acts. They are happenings
within a continuous matrix of activity. As acts, they are not literally
objects. Although they can be recognized as distinct and inviolable
elements of an ongoing process, they fuse into one another so seam-
lessly that it is impossible to say where one act ends and another act
begins. One act establishes the condition and grounds of another act
which continues or completes the first. Succeeding acts retain the
character of preceding acts, and the whole traces distinctive patterns
of growth and development definitive of life. There is also a complex
relation between parts and whole. Although elementary acts can be
parsed for purposes of analysis, they cannot be observed inde-
pendently of their participation in the dynamism of the whole. A good
example is Dewey’s (1896) description of the reflex arc in behavioral
psychology. Between stimuli and responses (acts psychologists take
for granted) are no definitive breaks, only imperceptible transitions.
Stimulus acts establish the conditions and tendencies of response acts,
which, in turn, prepare the ground for further stimulus acts. A living
dynamism, the reflex arc cannot be analyzed adequately as a mechani-
cal process. Its description requires a more dynamic vocabulary.
Living forms are distinguished from nonliving forms by their
patterning of act-elements. Acts comprising living forms set up a
dynamic system of tensions, which Haldane (1931) describes as a
&dquo;coordination of activity.&dquo; Often, as one act ascends over another, it
induces conditions which oppose that development, thus establishing
a dialectic. Unlike the forces described by Thompson (1961) that are
linked theoretically to the material form of the organism (e.g., as
gravity and surface tension arise in a bacterial cell), the tensions that
comprise living forms are linked theoretically to a nexus of acts. As
acts collide and interact, they establish the conditions of life. Living
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forms arise in more or less obvious degrees depending upon how
intensive and extensive the interplay of acts. A simple example of
living form is rhythm. In rhythmic activity, one act, such as expansion
of the lungs in inhalation, induces a countervailing act, such as
contraction of the lungs in exhalation, which, in tum, induces a reprise
of the original act, and so on in repetition. This pattern is analogous
to those met earlier between stimulus and response in the reflex arc,
between attraction and repulsion in Freud’s group psychology, and
between harmony and conflict in Simmel’s concept of society. These
and myriad other dynamisms among act elements are the empirical
phenomena of living forms. These living forms are not only qualities
of a physical system, they are phenomena unto themselves, logically
and empirically distinct from physical systems. Life is to body as
physiology is to anatomy Where there is no pattem of acts, there is
no living form. Tensions felt among acts are the perceptible stuff of
living form.
A Basis in Biology
The argument for a metaphysics of organism in social science finds
an ally in evolutionary biology. Two strands of evolutionary biology,
not often found in the same weave, join to suggest that human society
is a form of life. First, from sociobiology comes the argument that
social behavior results from natural selection of inclusive genetic
fitness. Individual behavior that is variously labeled altruistic, coop-
erative, or social is shown in the theory of kin selection, developed by
Hamilton and later elaborated by Wilson (1975), Dawkins (1989), and
others, to express selfish interests of genes. Because natural selection
does not operate on individual animals, but on genes, it can produce
cooperative behaviors that enhance the survival chances of a gene
even while compromising those of an individual animal (as when an
individual prairie dog wams others of a predator). Because kin are
likely to possess the same genes, any gene that enhances the survival
of kin is likely to proliferate in a population. Thus social behavior can
be explained as a natural product of biological evolution.
However, social behavior is not organism. That people act coop-
eratively or even altruistically does not in itself constitute an organism
or living form. Cooperative behavior, explicable by sociobiology,
establishes only the possibility of organism. This can be seen in the
social insects of the order Hymenoptera, particularly the ant. It is the
entomologist Wheeler who, at the turn of the century, pronounced the
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ant colony a real organism and not just a conceptual construction or
analogy. He based this claim on the many parallels between the colony
and other organisms. Both are singular soma made up of individu-
ated elements of germ plasm (ants in the colony, cells in the organ-
ism). Both take a constant form in time and space, and both are
self-regulating and self-maintaining (Wheeler 1939). All of this is true,
and yet the ant colony is not a living form in the sense described by
Whitehead or Langer. Whereas the ant colony is a continuous matrix
of activity in which actions of individual ants fuse in an integral and
self-maintaining flow, it is a matrix of bare pattern and dynamism.
There is little tension, rhythm, vibrancy, impetus toward resolution,
or growth-in short, little vitality. The ant colony is a mechanical
amalgamation of instinctive behaviors induced by chemical signals
called pheromones (Holldobler and Wilson 1990). It is an impressively
elaborate mechanism, but not much of a life.
Although sociobiological principles can explain social phenomena
as impressive as the intercourse of eusocial insects, they cannot ex-
plain the forms of human social life. Human social behavior is not tied
so neatly to genetics. Human social behavior entails a significant
element of play (Huizinga 1950) which produces a new logical
order-the human social form. In this social form, one finds levels
and kinds of conflict, tension, dynamism, rhythm, and growth that
are nowhere seen in a colony of ants or even in a troop of chimpanzees.
Human social forms are organic in an unprecedented way. The place
to look for social organisms is not the ant colony but the human group.
Sociobiological theory cannot explain human social forms, because it
reduces human social life to a story about genes and natural selection.
If social organisms exist, they must be entities beyond reduction. The
explanation for them must go beyond principles of natural selection
and inclusive genetic fitness.
How could human society arise as a distinct logical ordering, if not
by natural selection? An answer is suggested by the unique paleobi-
ology of Tielhard de Chardin, which is the second of our two strands
of evolutionary reasoning. Tielhard de Chardin offers a novel evolu-
tionary argument for the organism of human social organization.
Following Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, and others, Tielhard de Chardin
(1964) argues that a transpersonal realm of society exists as a definite
evolved order that envelops and controls individual persons. The
facts of this evolved order-what Durkheim calls &dquo;social facts&dquo;-are
of a higher order than the facts of psychology, which are higher still
than those of biology, chemistry, and physics. This transpersonal
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realm comprises a collective consciousness, a collective understanding.
It is at the level of mind and idea that human society takes its organic
form. &dquo;This opus humanum,&dquo; writes de Chardin, which is &dquo;achieved
gradually and laboriously through the growth of knowledge in the
face of evil, is something other than an act of higher morality; it is a
living organism&dquo; (1964, 21). With its development, &dquo;mankind has
come to present itself less as a haphazard and extrinsic association of
individuals, and increasingly as a biological entity&dquo; (155). As a result,
&dquo;the relation between Society and Social Organism is no longer a
matter of symbolism but must be treated in realistic terms&dquo; (155-56).
Tielhard de Chardin explains the evolution of this transpersonal
organism as a result of forces released by the psychic phenomena of
consciousness and reflection. &dquo;What distinguishes man’s psychol-
ogy,&dquo; he writes, &dquo;is that he alone among the animals knows that he
knows.... What has not been sufficiently noted is that by virtue of
this power of Reflection, living hominised elements are under an
irresistible compulsion of drawing close to one another, of communi-
cating, finally of uniting&dquo; (157-58). This compulsion may reflect a
primitive sociability which is genetically determined and explicable
by sociobiological principles. However, what happens when individ-
ual consciousnesses are brought together cannot be explained by
these principles but requires new explanatory principles. In the evo-
lution of mind, centers of consciousness do not fan out in new diver-
gent lines, but instead fold in upon themselves (Tielhard de Chardin
1964). This process of infolding, or &dquo;inflexion,&dquo; of psychic activities is
the central dynamic that forms the human social organism. It is a
definite movement, an ongoing closing and coiling. With it comes
increasing interpenetration of elements and activities to an eventual
point where so complete a unity is formed that elements meld into
each other and it is impossible to say where one ends and another
begins. With this movement comes also a release of psychic energies
that support the autonomy of the social organism and give it life of
its own.
Having introduced to paleobiology an intriguing notion of the
evolution of human social organisms from inflexion of individual
consciousnesses and emergence of collective consciousness, Tielhard
de Chardin (1964) leaves behind a nettlesome problem. &dquo;We cannot,&dquo;
he writes, &dquo;distinctly view its progress because the organism encloses
us, and to know a thing synthetically one has to be in control of it&dquo;
(21). Yet he suggests we have intimations of this organism and that,
thereby, it is not quite beyond our grasp.
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We need only to look about us at the multitude of disjointed forces
neutralizing each other and losing themselves in the confusion of
human society-the huge realities (broad currents of love or hatred
animating peoples and classes) which represent the power of aware-
ness but have not yet found a consciousness sufficiently vast to encom-
pass them all. We need only recall those moments in time of war when
wrested out of ourselves by the force of collective passion we have a
sense of rising to a higher level of human existence. All these spiritual
reserves, guessed at and faintly apprehended, what are they but the sure
evidence that creation is still on the move, but that we are not yet capable
of expressing all the natural grandeur of the human mission. (21-2)
For social science, the metaphysics of social life gives room to our
reluctant concept of organism. By its lights, society is a living entity
having determinative control over material and psychic processes of
social life. Society is a definite biological order over and above the
individual.
Two Objections Answered
To this metaphysics of social life two objections immediately sug-
gest themselves-one is the charge of animism, of seeing in society a
vitality that is not there; the other is the charge that human society is
more than living form and thus outside or beyond a metaphysics of
life. The first objection comes in the view of many writers that impres-
sions of vitality are everywhere the makings of an overactive imagi-
nation. Piaget (1968), for example, suggests that animistic perceptions
are confined mainly to early stages of cognitive development (in
preverbal children aged 2-7) and later give way to different (higher?)
perceptual forms. Animism, according to Piaget, is a naive and mis-
taken perceptual form that &dquo;results from assimilation of things into
one’s own activity&dquo; (27). It expresses &dquo;a confusion or a.lack of differ-
entiation between the internal or subjective world and the physical
universe&dquo; (27). With recognition of self as distinguished from other
objects in the world, and with development of verbal intelligence to
symbolize objects and relations, animistic beliefs are replaced by more
developed ideas. Animism also is frequently noted in the mentality
of so-called &dquo;primitive cultures,&dquo; the adjective &dquo;primitive&dquo; conveying
a similar idea of immaturity. Thus Levy-Bruhl (1926) has this to say
about the &dquo;primitive&dquo; mind:
This state of mental activity in primitives ... is not a purely or almost
purely intellectual or cognitive phenomenon, but a more complex one,
in which what is really &dquo;representation&dquo; to us is found blended with
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other elements of an emotional or motor character, coloured and im-
bued by them, and therefore implying a different attitude with regard
to the objects represented. (36)
And further,
The collective representations of primitives, therefore, differ very pro-
foundly from our ideas and concepts, nor are they their equivalent
either. On the one hand... they have not their logical character. On the
other hand, not being genuine representations, in the strict sense of the
term, they express, or rather imply, not only that the primitive actually
has an image of the object in his mind, and thinks it real, but also that
he has some hope or fear connected with it, that some definite influence
emanates from it, or is exercised upon it. This influence is a virtue, an
occult power which varies with objects and circumstances, but is al-
ways real to the primitive and forms an integral part of his repre-
sentation. (37-8)
The animistic thinking of primitive peoples is viewed the same way
as that of children-as naive, immature, unformed, unsophisticated,
and wrong.
To say animate perception is unsophisticated is not to say it is
unrealistic. A closer look belies the disparaging view taken of it and
shows that view to be scientistic, even culturally elitist. Recent re-
search in psychology finds substantial animism in adult perceptions,
enough perhaps to question if it is a passing feature of immaturity.
Sheehan, Papalia-Finlay and Hooper (1980) present data for 90 sub-
jects, aged 6 to 65+ years, showing a high frequency of animate
responses in all age groups. These responses are unrelated to logical
classification ability or to analytic cognitive style. Seitz and Beilin
(1987) examine levels of response to physiognomically suggestive
visual metaphor in photographs in 70 children ranging from pre-
school to college age and ranging in IQ from medium to high. Young
children show significant levels of physiognomic responding; older
and high-IQ children show even higher levels of response. In oppo-
sition to Piaget, there are good reasons to think animate perception is
an innate capacity of practical intelligence that develops with use and
that is not superseded by more refined perceptions. This is suggested
particularly by neurological studies that find brain processes specifi-
cally devoted to perceptions of living form. Nielson (1962, 81-2)
reports three cases of visual agnosia in which patients suffering
lesions to the left occipital lobe of the brain cannot recognize and
revisualize animate beings but can recognize and revisualize inani-
mate objects without impairment. Contrariwise, there are reported
cases of visual agnosia in which perceptions of inanimate objects are
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impaired and perceptions of animate beings are intact. It seems the
brain makes a distinction between living and nonliving beings that
social scientists cannot. Finally, and going beyond evidence of its
neurological basis, interest in animate perception is warranted for
the evolutionary advantage it confers to an animal having predators.
Quicker to see its nemeses, this animal lives to procreate another day
The most important defense of animate perception, however, is
that, in key respects, it is more realistic than the more &dquo;developed&dquo;
mode of perception that Piaget identifies with adult intelligence.
Whitehead (1934) criticizes the latter mode of perception, which he
identifies with positive science, for ignoring basic facts of the natural
world such as that it is coherent and that it is alive. By fixing narrowly
on sense perception (especially vision), modem science ignores wide
realms of feeling that are also part of human experience. The result is
a superficial and unrealistic view of the world composed of objects,
an error of conception he calls the &dquo;fallacy of misplaced concreteness.&dquo;
Brown (1959) goes further to argue that scientific perception is not
only mistakenly concrete but reflects an unhealthy anal-sadistic char-
acter structure. Scientific perception, according to Brown, is an uncon-
scious flight from the living body that arises from a basic anxiety
about death. Such perception, he argues, is a kind of &dquo;death-in-life&dquo;
that denies the proportions of life in the world.
Although acknowledged as a problem in philosophy and psycho-
analysis, the flight from animate perception is largely unrecognized
as a problem in social science. According to Brown (1959), &dquo;Contem-
porary social theory (again we must honor Veblen as an exception)
has been completely taken in by the inhuman abstractions of the path
of sublimation, and has no contact with concrete human beings, with
their concrete bodies, their concrete though repressed desires, and
their concrete neuroses&dquo; (318). The explanation for this is perhaps the
familiar one, namely, that social science has moved too quickly to
emulate big brother physical science. Instead of keeping strictly to
phenomena of social life, vague and inchoate though they may be, it
has confined itself to objects it can find, rushed into formalization, and
turned its back on the problem of knowledge.
A second and related objection to the metaphysics of social life
comes in the claim that human society is not an order of nature but
something else again (see, e.g., Haldane 1931). From the premise that
human consciousness is beyond life-that its aspects of valuation and
intention constitute a logical order beyond the biological-it could be
argued that insofar as human society exhibits consciousness (such as
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by having its own purposes, values, plans, memory, regrets, and the
like), then explanations based on a biological concept of life cannot be
applied.
This seemingly powerful objection rests on a bifurcation of mind
and body (and, by implication, a bifurcation of psychology and biol-
ogy) that need not be honored. Consciousness need not be conceived
apart from the body, but can be thought of as an aspect or phase of
body process. Consciousness is a biological phenomenon, a phenome-
non of life that arises under special circumstances of biological evo-
lution. Thus, in considering human society as living form, analysis
need not be confined to a cribbed concept of life that excludes con-
sciousness and mind. As noted above in regard to Tielhard de
Chardin’s paleobiology, the mental aspects of human society may
make it vital in ways that other animal societies are not. And even
Haldane (1931), who might be first to voice this objection, observes
that the human animal is alive in the double sense that its unity of
activity is expressed both over time (in virtue of its memory and
consciousness) and over space (in virtue of its physiology). What is
new in human experience is a greatly enlarged vitality that goes
beyond physiology into consciousness. Therefore, even if human
society is substantially minded (see Sandelands and Stablein 1987), it
is not on that account beyond living form.
TOWARD A SYMBOLISM OF SOCIAL LIFE
A basic problem of social science is to symbolize social life so we
can think and talk about it. This is the problem of conception. Our rich
sense of the life of society is disappointed by impoverished concepts.
As suggested above, our convictions about society rest on inchoate
intuitions, or feelings. Society has for us a physiognomy but no
conceptual identity A science of society requires symbols that have
both experiential and conceptual content, symbols coordinate with
feelings of society that can be integrated in a scheme of thought.
Language and the Cap of Invisibility
We have trouble symbolizing social life because we do not often
enough go beyond the bounds of natural language. Human society
cannot be described by language because it does not stand still long
enough to be looked at and named; it is too vital, too diffuse. Language
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is a discursive symbolism having two logical properties: (1) it isolates
meanings into more or less individuated units, and (2) it lays these
meanings out as a string of pearls, one after another in time. These
logical properties are key to its strengths and weaknesses as a sym-
bolism. The strengths of language stem from its isolation of meanings
into nameable units, such as words or phrases-that is, its object-
predicate structure. Through naming, whole realms of experience are
consolidated in simple denominations that can be compared. This not
only makes for efficient signification, it makes the symbolism itself a
kind of memory. As etymology shows, language comprises a history
of understanding. Naming also makes possible discovery of hidden
or latent meanings by means of metaphor. In judging similarities and
differences between concepts, new concepts can be invented adding
depth and nuance to thought. Finally, naming makes for combinato-
rial flexibility By segregating meanings into individual units and
arraying them in a sequence, meanings can be substituted and com-
bined in innumerable ways, limited only by conventions of syntax
(and even then sometimes in violation of these conventions).
Because of its power and flexibility, language is the dominant
symbolism of sentient life. Wherever exercised, it overwhelms more
subtle modes of symbolism. As Langer (1967) notes:
Discursive thinking, once started, runs on in its own loosely syllogistic
pattern from one proposition to another, actually or only potentially
worded, but with prepared forms of conception always at hand. Where
it seizes on any material-sensations, memories, fantasies, reflections-
it puts its seal of fixity, categorical divisions, oppositions, exclusions,
on every emerging idea, and automatically makes entities out of any
elements that will take the stamp of denotative words. (155)
This all-over-the-road imperiousness of language comes at a price,
and that price is an inability to symbolize phenomena that cannot be
decomposed into objects and predicates. Language compiles experi-
ence in a way that makes only certain conceptions possible. Experi-
ences that fit the logical form of language are conceivable, those that
do not are distorted or left to remain ineffable. This second category
includes all experiences of interaction, vitality, and feeling. By subject-
ing such phenomena to their object-predicate structure, a structure
which makes substances even of nonsubstances, language produces
a &dquo;cap of invisibility&dquo; (Langer 1967), which obscures processes and
dynamisms.
Arnheim (1966) discusses the problem of using discursive lan-
guage to conceptualize the idea of interaction, using the principle of
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yin and yang in Taoist Chinese philosophy as an illustration. Taoist
cosmology conceives nature as unceasing change in which existence
moves in an eternal &dquo;Return of the Same&dquo; (225). Nature is a &dquo;stationary
flux&dquo; (225) constituted by continuous and fluid interaction of the
female principle of yin (representing darkness, cold, moisture) and
the male principle of yang (representing light, warmth, dryness). By
interacting, these opposites produce the myriad forms and dyna-
misms of nature. How, Amheim asks, can we conceptualize this
interaction? In answer, he considers four concepts of interaction that
can be described discursively: (1) &dquo;mutual bombardment,&dquo; in which
stable entities do things to each other; (2) &dquo;circularity,&dquo; in which one
entity influences a second, which then turns around to influence the
first in a feedback loop; (3) &dquo;network,&dquo; in which elements are interre-
lated in a causal system; and (4) &dquo;hierarchic differentiation,&dquo; in which
parts define the whole and, in turn, are defined by the whole. In
reflecting on these four models, Amheim concludes that not one does
justice to interaction.
They all fail, not because of individual defects but because the task of
describing interaction discursively is insoluble in principle. Conceptual
theory can predict the outcome of interaction but it cannot adequately
describe the process itself since by its very nature it can account only
for linear connections among entities. All language is subject to the
same limitation. (231)
To conceive the interaction of yin and yang, Amheim argues, there
is no choice but to approach the problem perceptually, as, for example,
through the well-known visual symbol, the T’ai chi tu (see Figure 1).
&dquo;Perception,&dquo; writes Amheim, &dquo;accomplishes the feat the intellect
fails to describe; for perception is interaction&dquo; (232). Understanding
interaction involves perceiving the behavior of configurations of
visual forces which are spontaneously &dquo;interpreted&dquo; as images of the
behavior of forces in the interaction itself. Amheim goes on to analyze
the visual forces presented in the Tai chi tu to show how it symbolizes
the interaction so fundamental in Taoist cosmology.
What is true of interaction is true even more of complex dynamic
forms, such as societies. Society, likewise, cannot be put into words.
The object-predicate form of language invites conceptions of society
as a system of persons and relations, not as an integral living form
rooted in actions (Sandelands and St. Clair 1993). As a result, the felt
experience of society goes undescribed. One can see that a society is
made of persons but cannot see the society itself.
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Figure 1 : The T’ai chi tu
The dimensions of this problem can be seen in theories of society
that must make do with words. Most theories of organization are in
the tradition of Parsonian structural-functionalism (Dow 1988). This
tradition explains organization by dynamics that fit or adapt organi-
zations to environments. It is said either that organizations &dquo;adapt&dquo;
to their environments or that their environments &dquo;select&dquo; them out if
they are unadapted. As the author and Robert Drazin have elsewhere
argued (Sandelands and Drazin 1989), a problem with these perspec-
tives is that they describe a world that does not bear close scrutiny:
They speak of organizing processes that cannot be verified. When we
look behind the words, we find nothing so concrete or definite as the
words suggest. If it is asked how environments determine organi-
zation, the answer usually given is that they &dquo;select&dquo; or &dquo;choose&dquo;
one that is appropriate. However, to say that organization is se-
lected or chosen only incorporates the fact to be explained in the
verb used to do the explaining. The verbs to select and to choose do not
refer to definite activities, but rather to the consequences of unspeci-
fied activities. What appears to be a process only seems to explain
organization.
Structural-functional theories of organization are undermined by
words that do not name experiences. They attribute a misplaced
concreteness to the paradigmatic words organization and environment,
neither of which abstracts an experience; organization is flatly as-
serted, environment is defined negatively by substraction of the
organization from everything else. This explains why structural-
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functional theories rely upon vacuous verbs such as select or adapt to
do their bidding; as organization and environment are unestablished,
they can be related only by imaginary processes that operate (conve-
niently) behind the scenes.
There are problems no less in Giddens’ theory of social organiza-
tion as structuration, which is posed as a radical alternative to struc-
tural-functionalism (Giddens 1979). In this case, however, the prob-
lem is not mislaid concreteness, but interaction. Discursive language
fails Giddens the same way it fails Amheim. Giddens’ main insight is
that human knowledge of society and its workings must be incorpo-
rated in any theory of that society. Humankind is unique in the animal
kingdom in the extent of its self-knowledge. This knowledge is an
element in the production and reproduction of society in a process
Giddens calls &dquo;structuration.&dquo; Structuration theory finds social life to
be recursive, by which Giddens means that its essential feature is
interaction between the human individual’s capacity to act according
to his or her will (human agency) and the practices and resources that
constitute the social system (its structural properties). The structural
properties of social systems thus are both medium and outcome of
practices that constitute those systems. Giddens calls this the &dquo;duality
of structure.&dquo; The social system is the structured totality, the social
form. It is a continuously reproduced order of spatially and tempo-
rally situated events. This concept of social system is a picture of life,
a ceaseless flux, an ongoing creative development. It is Whitehead’s
&dquo;organism,&dquo; Langer’s &dquo;living form.&dquo;
The main problem for structuration theory is that discursive lan-
guage cannot convey the process. Language symbolizes propositions,
but the basic ideas of structuration theory are not propositional. The
paradigm concepts of structure, system, and structuration are incom-
mensurate with the object-predicate form of language. Structuration
is interaction. As discussed in the example from Amheim above,
referring to structuration, as Giddens does, as &dquo;mutual dependence&dquo;
(inAmheim’s phrase, &dquo;mutual bombardment&dquo;) or &dquo;recursiveness&dquo; (in
Amheim’s phrase, &dquo;circularity&dquo;) only highlights the problem of sym-
bolizing it discursively. Mutual dependence and recursiveness sug-
gest that structure and agency exist separately, independently of each
other and of the whole, and yet this is not what Giddens intends. For
Giddens, agency and structure can be separated analytically, but not
in fact. The concept of structure likewise poses a problem of concep-
tion. Giddens defines structure as dual; at once a medium of practice
and an outcome of practice. Structure is a strange amalgam of means
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and end; not quite a process and not quite a thing, but somehow both
and neither. It both exists and does not exist. &dquo;Structures,&dquo; writes
Giddens (1979), &dquo;exist paradigmatically as an absent set of differ-
ences, temporally present in their instantiation, in the constituting
moments of social systems&dquo; (64). Such a structure cannot be bent to
the object-predicate structure of discursive language. Finally, the
concept of system enjoys all the mystery of any other concept of living
form (see above). Giddens defines system as a reproduced order of
spatially and temporally situated events. But this definition is so
vague that it hard to tell what, if anything, answers to it. The word
system functions the same way as other words for society, as a place-
holder for an unconceptualized intuition of form. To be sure, Giddens’
definition of system is new. Yet it seems not to live up to its author’s
own inner idea of system: an idea of society as a life.
Giddens seems av. are of these difficulties when he acknowledges
that structuration is not a substantive theory of the constitution of
society, but rather a statement about ontological first-principles. It is
a statement about what a theory of society should be like and what it
should not be like (see Cohen 1989). Structuration theory is explicitly
critical of structural-functional social theory for, among other things,
reifying structure and system, not recognizing the reflexiveness of
social knowledge, making a paradox of the relationship between
human agency and social structure, and not recognizing the tempo-
rality of social forms. Against the backdrop of structuration theory,
one can better see failings of structural-functional theory as a concep-
tion of society. Nevertheless, structuration theory offers nothing in
place of the insubstantiality of structural-functionalism. Rooted no
less in language, it is subject to the same limitations. It offers, instead,
a kind of ontological correctness. It is clear about the many ways
language is unkind to our experiences of society and social life. But,
like other forms of correctness, it is fuzzy about how language should
be used. For no gain in conceptual power, it promises only fewer
violations of social life as we know it and more sanctimoniousness
about the violations that occur. In these respects, structuration theory
is an object lesson about the limits of discursive language for a science
of social forms.
Presentational Symbolism and the Shock of Recognition
Social science requires a symbolism capable of representing social
life with objects or forms that can be reflected upon. It requires
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symbols that can be assimilated into ongoing thought about social life,
and it must avoid symbols, such as those of language, that do not
demark experiences. These last are rocks that impede the flow of
scientific thinking, slowing it down and mixing it up in eddies of
nonsense.
An invaluable clue about symbols for social life comes from the
animistic mentality of children and members of primitive cultures.
Their world is sensibly alive; its objects are linked in a coherent drama
of forces, oppositions, tensions, and dynamics. Their ideas of things
are built upon a logic of life, instead of a logic of discursive language.
A case in point is the primitive’s idea of dan as a totem. The totem is
almost invariably a living being, vegetable or animal, that expresses
by its vitality a sense of the dan as a living body and the perceiver’s
part as a member. As Levy-Bruhl (1931) points out, for the primitive
the idea of being a &dquo;member&dquo; is not a metaphor but a literal expression
of a sensible fact.
Langer (1951) called the symbols of the primitive and the child
&dquo;presentational symbols,&dquo; in contrast to discursive symbols, and in
respect to their logical properties of wholeness, simultaneity, and
interaction. Others refer to these symbols using terms such as gestalt,
bildung, expressive form, and significant form. Presentational sym-
bols are perhaps best known to us in works of art. Art presents images
of felt life. The primary function of art, as Langer (1962) points out,
is to objectify feeling so that we can contemplate and understand it. It
is the formulation of so-called &dquo;inward experience,&dquo; the &dquo;inner life,&dquo;
that is impossible to achieve by discursive thought because its forms
are incommensurable with the forms of language and all its derivatives
(e.g., mathematics, symbolic logic). Art objectifies the sentience and
desire, self-consciousness and world-consciousness, emotions and
moods, that are generally regarded as irrational because words cannot
give us clear ideas of them.... Art presents the life of feeling for our
contemplation. It is the articulation of the morphology of feeling
through wordless abstraction. (90)
The significance of art, in this view, goes beyond its functioning as
an expression of inner life. It is also, and fundamentally, a mode of
discovery and conception. &dquo;The artist,&dquo; writes Cassirer (1953), &dquo;is just
as much a discoverer of the forms of nature as the scientist is a
discoverer of facts or natural laws&dquo; (184). As a symbolism, art is a way
of seeing, a means of meeting the world, and a means of constituting
its meaning. Through art, as opposed to discursive symbolism, it is
possible to understand realms of sentient life associated with feeling
that would otherwise be incomprehensible.
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The special power of art as a symbolism is its representation of vital
forms that cannot be rendered discursively: wholeness, simultaneity,
interaction, dynamism. The artist aims to transmit feeling. As feeling
is a culmination of vital process (a phase of vital activity), any symbol
of feeling must resemble the vital process from which the feeling
issues. All forms symbolic of feeling must, therefore, appear to be
living. The art object, notes Langer (1967), objectifies a feeling by
presenting a semblance of a living form in terms of which the beholder
can conceive it. This semblance of living form is experienced by the
beholder as a &dquo;shock of recognition.&dquo; It is an awareness that the
artwork is true to life in its rendering of feeling.
The semblance of living form in art is produced by a logical
structure that mirrors life. The elements of art, like those of life, are
not things but acts. They are virtual constituents that are likewise
&dquo;indivisible and inalienable from the whole&dquo; (Langer 1967, 200).
Furthermore, the dynamic structure of these elements is cognate to
the dynamic structure of acts in living organisms. Of these elements,
Langer writes:
All artistic elements whatever-all distinguishable aspects of the cre-
ated work-have formal properties which, in nature, characterize acts.
Inviolability, fuseability and the revivable retention of past phases in
succeeding ones are some of those properties. Another ... is the rela-
tionship of elements to the whole, which is very complex, so that it is
ordinarily not possible to designate it as a single relation. Every element
seems to emanate from the context in which it exists. (202)
Furthermore, and although produced by artistic illusion, the unity
and substantiality of the artwork rest upon many of the same princi-
ples as the unity and substantiality of living forms. Unity stems
primarily from interdependence of elements, and particularly as se-
cured by tensive relations. Substantiality is produced by the interac-
tion of illusions, often by a primary illusion set against less developed
secondary illusions. The result is a work of protean character, a work
of vitality, of indefinite possibilities that remain to be worked out. The
artwork becomes a virtual life, &dquo;a progressive realization of potential
acts&dquo; in which &dquo;every realized act changes the pattern and range of
what is possible,&dquo; thus making the living body &dquo;an ever-new constel-
lation of possibilities&dquo; (206).
Presentational symbols, such as works of art, achieve their effects
through the modes of perception to which they appeal. For example,
the great power of visual symbols arises in the symbolizing capacity
of the human visual system. Visual perception is visual thinking
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(Arnheim 1969). Unlike the discursive symbolism of language, which
of necessity is considered piecemeal, one object and relation at a time,
visual images are taken in all at once. The perceiver can see any
organic pattern of acts and intuit its meaning directly, without linguis-
tic mediation. Visual images make ideal symbols of life. Arnheim
(1966) calls this the capacity for &dquo;spontaneous perception of symbolic
meaning.&dquo; It will only be by turning to presentational symbolisms,
such as visual images, that social science will succeed in establishing
an empirically based idea of the form of life we call society.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the idea of organism in social science. It
has found that, despite being indispensable in social science writing,
organism remains largely unconceptualized. For this reason, it has
been a reluctant concept, both in biology, which first saw the need for
it, and in sociology, which has seen the need for it since. It is an idea
that lurks at the fringes of social science, not quite legitimate, but too
close to naive understanding and too useful to give up completely
Further, we have seen that, to be taken seriously, the idea of social
organism requires a new metaphysic, a metaphysic of life that con-
trasts with the limiting materialist metaphysic of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century physical science and that suggests new avenues
of investigation and inquiry This is a familiar point made long ago,
and better, by Whitehead, but not for that reason less valuable to
repeat. An outline of this metaphysic, which borrows from White-
head, Dewey, Langer, and Tielhard de Chardin, is offered in sugges-
tion of the work left to be done in bringing organism into the realm
of scientific study
Last, we have considered the problem of symbolizing social life.
Discursive symbolisms, such as language, are found to be logically
incommensurate with organism and thus incapable of representing it
adequately Their object-predicate structure places a &dquo;cap of invisibil-
ity&dquo; over social life, putting it beyond the pale of discursive report.
Presentational symbolisms, on the other hand, such as those which
appear in the mentality of children and in primitive cultures, and
which are developed acutely by artists, are found to be ideally suited
to organism. As their logical properties of wholeness, simultaneity,
and interaction are the logical properties of life, they can represent
organism in the mind’s eye and so produce the &dquo;shock of recognition&dquo;
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that validates our experiences of social life. These symbolisms are the
stuff of which an idea of society as organism can be made. It is only
by appeal to these latter symbolisms that social life can be an object
of reflective awareness and systematic scientific study
Returning to the images of society with which we started-Freud,
Bion, Le Bon, Toennies, Simmel, and MacLean-we can better appre-
ciate the glimpse of organism they afford. In them, we see act and
feeling elements in patterns of tension and dynamism. In them, we
find patterns of growth and development characteristic of organism.
Each condition of the group bears the stamp of conditions before it.
Early events and dynamics foreshadow later events and dynamics,
producing a unique history and personality. The group appears as
nothing so much as an adaptive and growing organism. It is also
possible to see in these portraits the peculiar relation of parts to whole
that distinguishes living from nonliving forms. Whereas their parts-
which are acts, not things&horbar;can be parsed for purposes of analysis and
exposition, they cannot be observed independently of their participation
in the dynamism of the whole. Although it remains for future work
to develop symbols of social life and to integrate those symbols in a
conception of social life, this paper is an initial effort of due diligence to
gauge the soundness of making the necessary investment of time and
energy. Surely the prospects are promising enough to go a little farther.
There is, finally, an irony in the idea of organism applied to human
social life. In an odd turnabout upon the concreteness of natural life
as compared to social life (i.e., plants, animals, and even microbes can
be seen in ways that societies cannot), organism may be easier to
discern in the latter than in the former. Whereas in natural life,
perceptions of organism compete against more compelling percep-
tions of physical form, there is no such competition in social life.’ 7
Because social science does not enjoy the same advantages of obser-
vation, it may be easier to appreciate organism in it. Social science may
teach biological science something about the nature of life. A final aim
of this paper, therefore, is to begin to bring faint and guessed-at
apprehensions of social life into the light of reflective awareness
where they can become proper subjects of scientific study and debate.
NOTES
1. This parallel is not absolute, as Durkheim is careful to point out. Whereas in the
theory of speciation, contesting species fight to the death, in the division of labor,
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contesting parties fight only to reach a new reconciliation, wherein an original mutual-
ity and solidarity is transformed and preserved in a new form (original mechanical
solidarity is transformed to a new organic solidarity).
2. Freud illustrates this dialectical tension with the help of Schopenhauer’s famous
simile of the freezing porcupines.
A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold
winter’s day so as to profit by one another’s warmth and so save themselves
from being frozen to death. But soon they felt one another’s quills, which
induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought
them nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were
driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the other, until they had
discovered a mean distance at which they could most tolerably exist. (quoted in
Freud 1922/1959, 41)
3. The vital images detailed in the work of Freud and Bion were later elaborated by
Stock, Thelen, Lieberman, Hare and others of the Human Dynamics Laboratory at the
University of Chicago. As summarized by Stock and Thelen (1958), this work rests upon
an image of the human group as a life unto itself&mdash;as an adaptive process. "The word
’group,’ " they write, "stands for some organizing principle that enables us to see the
behaviors of individuals, not as random, separate events, nor yet as simple stimulus-
responses connections, but rather as having a place within a manifold of behaviors that
began in the past and can be projected into the future" (9). On the one hand, the group
is a definite phenomenon; a vital flow, a manifold of behaviors with a past, present, and
future. On the other hand, the group is not a simple "thing" to be seen or touched, but
a word for some organizing principle. The group is not an object, but a life.
4. Today, the literal concept of organism survives only at the controversial margins
of social science, in the fields of sociobiology and complex adaptive systems. Sociobi-
ology, first outlined by Wilson in 1975 and since fought about more for its moral
implications than for its substance, seeks to establish the genetic basis and evolution of
animal society, including human society. It argues that certain social behaviors and
forms evolve by natural selection (i.e., as genomic adaptations to circumstances). The
theory of complex adaptive systems propounded by Holland (1992) and others
likewise construes social systems, such as economies and social organizations, as
adaptive organisms which reproduce and adapt by means of genetic algorithms that
resemble those described in molecular genetics. Sociobiology and complex adaptive
systems theory thus recall some of the insights with which social science began at the
turn of the century.
5. This postmodern strain of theory thus radically opposes the earliest ideas of social
theory which insisted that concepts of social form be rooted in literal concepts of
organism. It would be fascinating to know how the early theorists would greet the ideas
of their postmodernist offspring. One imagines they might recoil in horror, believing
that social theory can advance only if it again takes literally the idea of organism and
returns it to good standing from the netherworld of literary trope. From their vantage
point, there is great danger in the idea that social scientists should not think literally.
6. Haldane adds an intriguing suggestion that biological interpretation is prior to
physical and/or chemical interpretations. He argues that persistent coordinations,
which are the subject of biology, are the first facts of nature and come before those taken
for granted by physics or chemistry. It is a mistake, he suggests, to inquire of the physical
or chemical origins of life. There are no origins of life; it has always existed. There never
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was, and could never be, a movement from nonlife to life. The question arises only as
a misconception stemming from the narrow metaphysics of Newtonian physics that
conceives a world of independent objects and relations. Haldane concludes: "However
low down we may go in the scale of life, and however far back we may trace the
development of life, it is still life that we find" (38).
7. This point is suggested by the development of the science of morphology,
particularly as it appears in the pioneering work of Goethe. As Engard (1952) points
out in his introduction to his collection of Goethe’s botanical writings, Goethe’s concept
of morphology as an ever-moving process of becoming could arise only with his
rejection of the Linnean analytical typology of species which was based upon observa-
tions of the fixed and unchanging characteristics of visible life forms.
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